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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of the conditions of local labour markets on the 
social networks of immigrants, with an emphasis on co-ethnic contact and contact 
with people native to the locality. This study focuses on the case of immigrants in 
the Netherlands. For this case, I derived and empirically tested a job and residential 
search model. I found that a high job arrival rate and large wage differences between 
the ethnic labour market and the host labour market both correlate with immigrants 
developing stronger co-ethnic networks and weaker native networks as well as with 
immigrants choosing to live in more ethnically concentrated areas. These findings 
suggest that local economic prosperity does not necessarily beget social integration: 
in this case study, immigrants spontaneously assimilated less into the host society 
during a good economic period.
JEL Classification R23 · J15 · Z13
1 Introduction
Migrants’ network composition substantially affects their economic performances 
(Battisti et al. 2016; Chiswick and Wang 2016; Kanas et al. 2012; Lancee 2010). The 
first type of social network is developed among the co-ethnic group. Ethnic commu-
nities often help new immigrants to settle and find work (Chiswick and Miller 2004; 
Patacchini and Zenou 2012). However, the immigrant’s success in the local labour 
market is equally dependent on their ability to network with the community native 
to the area. Native populations often provide immigrants with job information of 
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higher quality, as this population is typically very informed and familiar with the 
local labour market (Iosifides et al. 2007; Kazemipur 2006; Lancee 2012).1
In the Netherlands, the discourse on the integration of ethnic minorities has 
undergone profound changes over the past few decades (Scholten and Holzhacker 
2009). The first phase of this discourse emerged in the 1960s when Turks and 
Moroccans migrated to the Netherlands in large numbers as ‘guest workers’. At 
this time, Dutch political discourse stressed that it was important for ethnic minori-
ties to build strong social networks among themselves. This discourse discouraged 
migrants from networking with natives; the administration ultimately hoped that 
these temporary workers would return to their home countries when their work was 
complete. The second phase occurred in the 1980s, when Dutch immigration policy 
allowed for the permanent settlement of ethnic minorities; in this period, local polit-
ical discourse began to encourage the development of networks between immigrants 
and natives. After 2000, a third phase emerged. This phase is defined by a discourse 
that suggested that co-ethnic networks were eroding Dutch national identity. In 
response to this fear, political discourse became assimilationist (Bruquetas-Callejo 
et al. 2006; Joppke 2007).
Today, almost all countries with high immigration rates encourage immigrants to 
integrate into the native population. However, immigrants can sometimes struggle 
to integrate. As such, scholars are becoming increasingly interested in the underly-
ing mechanisms of social networking in the very early phase of immigration. Indi-
vidual socio-demographic characteristics such as age (Glaeser et al. 2002), educa-
tion (Huang et al. 2009; Martinovic et al. 2009), family composition (Roskruge et al. 
2013b), and home ownership (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Roskruge et al. 2013a) 
are frequently presented as the determinants of individual social capital accumula-
tion. However, this view overlooks very important meso-level determinants, i.e. the 
conditions of the local labour market, with only a few exceptions (Roskruge et al. 
2012; Sato and Zenou 2015; Zenou 2015). Moreover, little work has been done on 
how local labour market conditions determine migrants’ time allocation between 
co-ethnic networks and native networks. And yet, the growing rate of interna-
tional migration demands studies that give us deeper knowledge about the nuances 
of migrant networks.2 This paper aims to fill this gap in the scholarly archive by 
responding to the following research questions: how do local labour market condi-
tions impact an immigrant’s social networking? Do immigrants invest more in native 
networks during good economic conditions?
To answer these questions, I employ a standard job search model with an endog-
enous network intensity (see e.g. Goel and Lang 2019; Montgomery 1992; Mortensen 
1986; Van Den Berg and Van Der Klaauw 2006). To maximise her utility, an immi-
grant searches for a job and chooses a location of residence at the same time while 
1 There are various terms expressing similar meanings. Take, for example, ‘homophily’ and ‘hetero-
phily’ (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954), ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973), ‘bonding’ and 
‘bridging’ (Putnam 2000; Woolcock and Narayan 2000), and ‘intragroup interaction’ and ‘intergroup 
interaction’ (Martí and Zenou 2009).
2 According to UN statistics, the total number of international migrants in the world has increased by 
about 100 million over the past 20 years, and the total number is expected to reach 405 million by 2050.
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also choosing the optimal allocation of her time between co-ethnic networks and native 
networks. The comparative statics from the model yield some implications on the 
relationship between an immigrant’s network composition and the conditions of the 
local labour market. I test these implications using a micro dataset of immigrants in 
the Netherlands with the aid of regional information from Statistics Netherlands. The 
first dataset is the Dutch survey ‘Sociale Positie en Voorzieningengebruik Allochtonen’ 
(SPVA), which is a large-scale, cross-sectional survey of the four largest non-Western 
immigrant groups in the Netherlands: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans. 
It contains rich information on the socio-economic characteristics and social contact 
frequencies of immigrants. The second dataset is the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
(CBS), which provides information about the provincial levels of ethnic concentration 
and yearly local labour market conditions. I merge these datasets to identify the local 
labour market conditions in the year of an immigrant’s first job search.
I find that local labour market conditions are associated with the degree of 
migrants’ social integration. First, a more buoyant labour market leads to more co-
ethnic networking and little native networking as well as the residential choice of 
more ethnically concentrated areas. It appears that an incompatibility exists between 
local economic prosperity and migrants’ social integration in the sense that immi-
grants spontaneously assimilate less into host society when the host economy is 
good. This result implies that when the economy is booming, migrants are more 
concerned with building an ethnic community and participating in cultural activities 
than with optimising their job search. However, in economic recessions, the oppor-
tunity cost of developing networks is low enough that migrants have an incentive to 
bridge. Second, a larger wage difference between the ethnic labour market and the 
host labour market leads to a more co-ethnic networking, less native networking, 
and the residential choice of more ethnically concentrated areas. At first sight, this 
conclusion is surprising: shouldn’t economic incentive drive immigrants to develop 
more native networks? I argue that changes in the demands of the labour market may 
account for these findings. Because the relatively lower wage in the ethnic labour 
market increases labour demand, co-ethnic networking may offer immigrants a 
faster and easier return than native networking.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows:  Section 2 presents a theo-
retical model where comparative statics are derived for labour market conditions and 
individual characteristics. Section 3 empirically tests the model’s implications. The 
final section provides concluding remarks and discusses avenues for future research.
2  A theoretical model
The theoretical framework is based on a standard job search model with an endoge-
nous network intensity. I present a simplistic setting in which immigrants are unem-
ployed at the time of entering the destination country.3 Upon arrival, immigrants 
3 It was reported that 58% of immigrants arrive in the Netherlands without having a definite job (Source: 
SPVA).
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make decisions about how much time to spend with co-ethnic people and native 
people and about where to reside. In considering the conditions of the local labour 
market, immigrants choose the optimal ethnic concentration level and social interac-
tion level to maximise their utility.
I divide the labour markets for immigrants into an ethnic labour market and a 
host labour market. This division is analogous to, but not entirely the same as, Reich 
et al. (1973) and Bulow and Summers (1986)’s dual market segmentation. The ethnic 
labour market is primarily constituted by elementary jobs. The wages in this market 
are low, and the positions do not require much effort. In the early years of immigra-
tion, many migrant workers specialise in manual labour. Meanwhile, the host labour 
market is primarily constituted by high-wage jobs and job ladders, and positions that 
are more intensely predicated on communication-language tasks relative to the eth-
nic market. Access to the two markets depends on the migrant’s social network: the 
co-ethnic network facilitates the spread of job information in the ethnic labour mar-
ket, while the native network provides the migrant with information about better job 
opportunities in the host labour market. The ethnic labour market and the host labour 
market give different economic incentives for immigrants to develop social networks, 
and immigrants must allocate time between co-ethnic networks and native networks 
to maximise their utility. It is important to note that just because a worker accepts a 
job does not mean that they will hold that position for the long-term. A job may end 
for some exogenous reason, and the worker may need to search for a job once again.
2.1  A job search model
Consider an unemployed immigrant searching for a job. The unemployment benefit 
is b. The individual can conduct her employment search by using either her co-eth-
nic contacts (for the ethnic labour market) or her native contacts (for the host labour 
market). Every individual allocates her social time between the co-ethnic group and 
the native group, where the time constraint is normalised to 1. An amount of time 
s is devoted to the co-ethnic network, and 1 − s is devoted to the native network. 
For simplicity, I situate the co-ethnic network as incurring no cost, and the native 
network as incurring the cost of 훽 . Jobs are offered to the immigrant according to a 
Poisson process, with rate s훼1 for the ethnic labour market and (1 − s)훼2 for the host 
labour market. A job offer is characterised by a random draw from contact-specific 
wage offer distributions, F1 for the ethnic labour market and F2 for the host labour 
market. w
1
 and w1 , and w2 and w2 are, respectively, the lower bound and upper bound 
for the two wage distributions. The exogenous layoff rate is 훿 and is the same for 
both markets.
e refers to the level of ethnic concentration in a residential area. On the one hand, 
ethnic concentration e generates a significant psychic benefit for immigrants, and 
it compensates for the potential wage gap between the ethnic labour market and 
the host labour market. It yields a psychic benefit R(s,  e), with Re > 0 , Rs > 0 , 
and Res > 0 . On the other hand, living in an ethnic enclave weakens the efficiency 
with which an individual can search for higher-paid jobs in the host labour market 
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because it limits the exposure the migrant has to the natives. Therefore, an efficiency 
function G(e) ∈ [0, 1] is introduced. G(0) = 1 and G′ < 0 hold.
An unemployed immigrant who has newly arrived derives utility as follows:
where rU is the flow value of being unemployed with r being the interest rate. This 
equals the instantaneous net pay-off b + R(s, e) − C(s) , plus the probability s훼1 of 
accepting a job offer from wage distribution F1(w) , and the probability (1 − s)훼2G(e) 
of accepting a job offer from wage distribution F2(w).
Once a job offer is accepted, the worker keeps it until an exogenous separation 
occurs. The inflow value of being employed at the wage rate w is:
which equals the sum of the instantaneous net pay-off w + R(s, e) , minus the 
expected loss of being laid off. The psychic benefit function R(s, e) remains. Once 
the network is developed, it lasts even if the immigrant becomes unemployed, ena-
bling the worker to continue to reap psychic benefits from their network during peri-
ods of unemployment.
Equation (1) is simplified to the following maximisation problem with respect to 
s and e:4
with Qi being the surplus function of Fi(w):
wr is the reservation wage rate. Note that job offers from the host labour market have 
a higher surplus than those from the ethnic labour market, i.e. Q2 − Q1 > 0 . The 
reservation wage wr should be the same for both markets, as the probability of being 
laid off ( 훿 ) is the same.
The heterogeneity of job arrival rates emerges with the difference in labour 
demand. If there is a high wage gap between the host labour market and the ethnic 
labour market, then the ethnic labour market has a relatively higher demand for 
workers, making jobs in this market more accessible. It is written that 
(1)
rU = b + R(s, e) + s훼1 ∫
w1
w
1
max[W(w) − U, 0]f1(w)dw
+ (1 − s)훼2G(e)∫
w2
w
2
max[W(w) − U, 0]f2(w)dw − C(s),
(2)rW(w) = w + R(s, e) − 훿(W(w) − U),
(3)max
s,e
rU = b + R(s, e) +
s훼1
r + 훿
Q1 +
(1 − s)훼2 ⋅ G(e)
r + 훿
Q2 − C(s),
(4)Qi = ∫
wi
wr
(1 − Fi(w))dw,
4 See “Appendix 2” for the derivation.
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훼1 = 훼 ⋅
E(w2)−E(w1)
E(w1)
 and 훼2 = 훼.5 The term 
E(w2)−E(w1)
E(w1)
 captures the average wage dif-
ference between two labour markets.
2.2  Solutions and comparative statics
The model has three arguments: wr , s, and e. To solve the model, I shall derive the 
two first-order conditions for s and e from Eq. (3), respectively, and use the reserva-
tion wage identity (i.e. the immigrant is indifferent about accepting a job offer at a 
wage rate of wr and remaining unemployed).
I implement a numerical simulation to analyse the comparative statics from the inte-
rior solution of the model.6 Given feasible ranges for all parameters, the comparative 
statics show that the optimal solutions w∗
r
 , s∗ , and e∗ vary with other parameters, 
especially those describing the labour market conditions. To achieve this, I assign 
specific functional forms and calibrate all parameters with appropriate values.
First, I choose specific forms for the various functions in the model. An unem-
ployed individual samples one independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) offer 
each period from a known distribution Fi . The wage offer density function is chosen 
as the following functional form (Van Den Berg 1990): fi(w) = 1w ⋅
1
log(wi∕wi)
 for w in 
[w
i
,wi] , with wi being the upper bound, and wi being the lower bound of its corre-
sponding wage offer distribution. The psychic benefit function is written as 
R(s, e) = b ⋅ s ⋅ e(1+휎) . 휎 ∈ [0, 1] proxies individual preference for residing in ethni-
cally concentrated areas.7 The higher 휎 is, the more compensated she is by ethnic 
concentration. The unemployment benefit b is used as an adjustment term to 
(5)wr + C(s) − b −
s훼1
r + 훿
Q1 −
(1 − s)훼2 ⋅ G(e)
r + 훿
Q2 = 0;
(6)Rs +
훼1 ⋅ Q1 − 훼2 ⋅ G(e) ⋅ Q2
r + 훿
− C� = 0;
(7)Re +
(1 − s) ⋅ G� ⋅ 훼2 ⋅ Q2
r + 훿
= 0.
6 There are also two corner solutions to the model: (1) s∗ = 0 , e∗ = 0 , and (2) s∗ = 1 , e∗ = 1 . The first 
equilibrium is stable only if 𝛽 < 𝛼2Q2−𝛼1Q1
2b(r+𝛿)
 . This implies that when the cost of developing native networks 
is small, the immigrant no longer requires co-ethnic contact. The economic benefit from job offers in the 
host labour market is much higher than the psychic benefit from living in an ethnic enclave. The second 
equilibrium is always stable. This scenario situates the immigrant as communicating only with her co-
ethnic group, i.e. as not communicating with natives at all. The marginal benefit of s and e is always 
higher than the marginal cost.
7 In the highly influential works of Schelling (1969, 1971), the residential composition preference is sin-
gled out as a critical factor in explaining persistent segregation. I incorporated the Schelling-type resi-
dential preference in the search model for individual sorting.
5 In mathematical terms, E(wi) = ∫ wiw
i
wdFi(w).
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monetise the psychic benefit. The higher b is, the more satisfaction she gets from an 
ethnically concentrated area. The efficiency function is written as G(e) = (1 − e)2 , 
which satisfies G′ < 0 . Lastly, the cost function is written as C(s) = b ⋅ 훽(1 − s)2 . 
Like the psychic benefit function, the unemployment benefit b is also used as an 
adjustment term to monetise the cost of developing native networks.
Second, I calibrate all labour market parameters using Dutch labour market 
facts from the year 1994 (as reported by CBS). A quarter is used as the time unit. 
The CPI adjusted unemployment benefit per quarter is 2234 euros, and this is set 
to be the value for b.8 By assumption, the exogenous job separation is the only 
reason for unemployment. The inflow rate of the unemployed per quarter is 7%, 
and this is set to be the value for 훿 . Wage distribution in the ethnic labour mar-
ket was determined by those sectors most likely to hire foreign-born workers, 
namely: (1) industry and energy and (2) trade, transport, hotels, and restaurants. 
The lower bound of the wage is 2973 euros per quarter, and the higher bound 
of the wage is 4200 euros per quarter. Wage distribution in the host labour mar-
ket was determined by those sectors most likely to hire native workers, namely: 
(1) information and communication; (2) financial services; (3) rental and com-
mercial property; (4) business services; (5) government and care; and (6) culture, 
recreation, and other services. The lower bound of the wage is 3699 euros per 
quarter, and the highest bound of the wage is 5148 euros per quarter. Therefore 
w
1
= 2973,w1 = 4200,w2 = 3699 , and w2 = 5148 . The yearly long-term interest 
rate is 7.2%, and the corresponding quarterly rate is calculated as 1.8%9 (Van Der 
Bie and Smits 2001). Therefore r is set to be 0.018. The value for 훼 is calculated 
from the hazard rate 훼[1 − F(wr)] . The average period of a job search is 2.97 quar-
ters, making the hazard rate of 1∕2.97 = 0.337 . Solving the hazard rate function, 
Eqs. (5), (6), and (7) together yield the solution 0.5 for 훼 . The calibration of all 
parameters is shown in Table 1.
Each time, one parameter varies within the range of simulation in Table 1, with 
all other parameters fixed at their initial values. The comparative statics of social 
integration indicators s∗ and e∗ , with respect to all the labour market parameters, are 
summarised in Table 2.
This table implies that co-ethnic networking unambiguously: (1) rises with the 
job arrival rate, 훼 ; (2) declines with the layoff rate, 훿 ; (3) declines with wage offered 
in the ethnic labour market, w
1
 and w1 ; and (4) rises with wage offered in the host 
labour market, w
2
 and w2 . It also implies that the probability a migrant will choose to 
live in an ethnically concentrated area unambiguously: (1) rises with the job arrival 
rate, 훼 ; (2) declines with the layoff rate, 훿 ; and (3) rises with wage offered in the host 
labour market, w
2
 and w2.
8 Although an immigrant who has just arrived at the destination country may not be eligible for unem-
ployment benefits, it is likely that she does have some monetary sources such as family remittances or 
savings. The value of this parameter here is simply a proxy for this amount of money during unemploy-
ment.
9 The compound interest formula (1 + r)4 = 0.072 is used here.
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2.3  Hypotheses derived from the model
I derive some testable hypotheses with regard to local labour market conditions. 
Here I stick to the assumption that the labour market conditions are exogenous 
factors to migrants, in particular at the moment upon arrival. Migrants accept the 
labour market conditions as given and decide how they build up their social net-
works and choose where to live.10
When the overall labour market is strong and promising due to an exogenous positive 
demand shock (high 훼 and low 훿 ), immigrants are able to get a job from their friends or 
acquaintances from the same country of origin relatively easily compared with network-
ing with the native population. This suggests that a higher job arrival rate or a lower job 
destruction rate leads to more co-ethnic networking and less native networking ( H1 ); and 
a higher job arrival rate or a lower job destruction rate correlates with the immigrant 
choosing to reside in more ethnically concentrated areas ( H2).
The average wage difference between the ethnic labour market and the host 
labour market (embodied, respectively, in w
1
 and w1 , and w2 and w2 ) also impacts the 
migrant’s choice of social network and residence. A large difference in wages leads 
to differences in labour demand in the ethnic market and the host market and ulti-
mately makes jobs in the ethnic labour market more accessible. As such, an incen-
tive emerges for immigrants to focus their search more in the ethnic labour market. 
In addition, because a large difference in wage is usually accompanied by wage dis-
crimination, such a difference further drives immigrants to cluster together. From 
these findings, the following hypotheses are derived: A higher average wage differ-
ence between the ethnic labour market and the host labour market leads to more 
co-ethnic networking and less native networking ( H3 ); and a higher average wage 
difference between the ethnic labour market and the host labour market encourages 
migrants to reside in more ethnically concentrated areas ( H4).
3  An empirical analysis
In order to test these hypotheses, I make use of two datasets from the Nether-
lands to study the determinants of its immigrants’ social networks and ethnic con-
centrations. Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans are the four largest 
Table 2  The comparative statics 
of s∗ and e∗ Parameters 훼 훿 w1 w1 w2 w2
s∗ + − − − + +
e∗ + − − + + +
10 A possible concern is that migrants comprise a self-selected sample. For example, a good economy at 
the destination country only attracts migrants in favour of co-ethnic networks, while a bad economy only 
attracts migrants in favour of local networks. I check this self-selection issue in Fig. 1 in the later section. 
In brief, I compared different cohorts of migrants by year of entry. Their degrees of co-ethnic contact and 
levels of ethnic concentration are not directly correlated with the labour market conditions.
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immigrant ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. Turks and Moroccans were 
responsive to the ‘guest workers’ programme by the Dutch government, and 
migrated to the Netherlands in large numbers in the 1960s. Family reunifica-
tion in the 1980s and second-generation children born in the Netherlands then 
substantially increased the proportion of Turks and Moroccans in the country. 
A mass inflow of Surinamese took place after the decolonisation of Surinam 
in 1975. Meanwhile, large groups of people from the Netherlands Antilles (an 
autonomous area within the Kingdom of the Netherlands) have been migrating 
to the Netherlands since the 1990s. These massive inflows of immigrants to the 
Netherlands have made the sociocultural adaptation of these four ethnic minority 
groups a central political topic.
3.1  Data and variables
The first dataset is the Dutch survey ‘Sociale Positie en Voorzieningengebruik 
Allochtonen’ (SPVA), which is a large-scale, cross-sectional survey of the four 
largest non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands, which are, as stated 
above: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans. The survey reports infor-
mation about the socio-economic and sociocultural position of the four largest 
ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The sample frame consists of 10–13 cities 
(depending on the survey year) in which immigrants are relatively overrepre-
sented. The survey was conducted in the years of 1991, 1994, 1998, and 2002, 
with, respectively, 2581, 2572, 5231, and 3614 households. My analysis uses the 
data about the head of the household. The second dataset is the Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek (CBS), which provides ethnic concentrations and annual local 
labour market conditions at the provincial level.
The two dependent variables in which we are most interested are the social net-
work variable s∗ and the ethnic concentration variable e∗ . The social network vari-
able is a measure of the relative time the migrant spends with co-ethnic contacts 
relative to native Dutch people. Contact composition: the respondent was asked 
about frequency of her co-ethnic and Dutch contact during her free time. The three 
categories are: (1) more contact with the Dutch; (2) equal contact with Dutch and 
co-ethnics; (3) more contact with co-ethnics. The variable is recoded as a numeri-
cal value between 1 and 3. The higher the value, the greater the time the migrant 
allocated to developing co-ethnic networks. Ethnic concentration: this is measured 
by the percentage of the respondent’s ethnic group in the resident population of the 
province, for, respectively, Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans.11
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the social network variable and the 
ethnic concentration variable. It shows that the ethnic composition varies signifi-
cantly across four ethnic groups. In general, Surinamese people and Antilleans 
networks more with Dutch people relative to Turks and the Moroccans. Turks 
demonstrate the highest level of co-ethnic networks. 64% of the Turks have more 
11 The variable is constructed using the population statistics in CBS.
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co-ethnic contacts than Dutch contacts, while Antilleans demonstrate the lowest 
level of co-ethnic networking. However, the ethnic concentration level evidences 
a different pattern. Surinamese people, who have a historic colonial tie with the 
Netherlands, demonstrate the highest level of ethnic concentration ( 7% ) in the 
case population. In contrast, Antilleans demonstrate the lowest level of ethnic 
concentration ( 1% ) in the case population.12
The second dataset from CBS provides the conditions of the labour market. 훼 is 
proxied by vacancies per every thousand jobs in each province between the years of 
1992 and 2001. 훿 is proxied by the percentage of inflow into unemployment benefits 
in each province (unit: percentages) between 1992 and 2001. The wage information 
( w1,w1,w2,w2 ) is proxied by the average wage rates of representative sectors in both 
the ethnic labour market and the host labour market (unit: euros per month) between 
the years of 1960 and 2001. Wage distribution in the ethnic labour market was deter-
mined using the following sectors: (1) industry and energy and (2) trade, transport, 
hotels, and restaurants. Meanwhile, wage distribution in the host labour market 
was determined using the following sectors: (1) information and communication; 
(2) financial services; (3) rental and commercial property; (4) business services; (5) 
government and care; and (6) culture, recreation, and other services.
Merging these datasets enables us to identify how the conditions of the local 
labour market in the year of the immigrant’s first job search impacts her decisions 
about social networking and ethnic concentration. Labour market parameters are 
matched to each immigrant in the micro-data, with job search year and province 
as identifiers.13 The model assumes that the conditions of the labour market dur-
ing the job search year play a formative role in the immigrant’s decisions about 
social networking. In SPVA, I use the year that the first job was obtained in the 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics of social network composition and ethnic concentration at province level 
across ethnicity for cross-sectional data, adult immigrants. Source: SPVA and CBS
The social network variable is dichotomous with a value of either 0 or 1. The figures in the table are the 
percentage of respondents who fit the description of the first column within each ethnic group. The eth-
nic concentration is measured by the percentage of the respondent’s ethnic group in the resident popula-
tion of the province
Sample size: 13998
Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans
During free time: more contact with Dutch 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.41
During free time: equal contact 0.27 0.44 0.45 0.37
During free time: more contact with co-ethnics 0.64 0.44 0.33 0.22
Ethnic concentration at province level 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01
12 In Appendix 1, Table 6 shows a list of all variables in SPVA, with their detailed definitions and cod-
ing, and Table 7 presents descriptives for the demographic variables.
13 For sector wage rates, there is no regional difference, and hence the job search year is the only identi-
fier.
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Netherlands.14 The analysis includes all Dutch provinces: Groningen, Friesland, 
Drenthe, Overijssel, Flevoland, Gelderland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Hol-
land, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, and Limburg.
Figure  1 shows a time series of the key variables from year 1992 to 2001. The 
upper panels are proxies for 훼 and 훿 , respectively. An increasing trend for vacancies 
and decreasing trend for the percentage of unemployment inflow are evident. The 
lower panels are proxies for s∗ and e∗ , respectively. There is not a clear pattern of how 
s∗ and e∗ fluctuates with the years. To better identify the impacts of local labour market 
conditions on s∗ and e∗ , the next subsection considers the structural-form specification.
3.2  Simultaneous equations and instrumental variables
The structural-form specification of the model is a system of two equations, where s∗ 
and e∗ are interdependent of each other and both dependent on a set of labour market 
parameters and individual parameters, written as:
(8)
Si,t = c11 + c12Xi,t + c13LMi,t0 + c14Ei,t + 휀1,t, t = 1,… , T and i = 1,… , I,
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Fig. 1  Year trend of 훼 , 훿 , s, and e on average
14 While year of entry could also be an option, it cannot proxy the job search year for immigrants who 
moved to the Netherlands at a younger age.
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where i stands for individuals; t stands for survey years; t0 is the search year of the 
first job; S is the social network variable; E is the ethnic concentration; X are a set of 
individual characteristics; LM are labour market variables (at time t0 ); 휀1 and 휀2 are 
disturbance terms.
Si,t and Ei,t are jointly endogenous variables by construction. If 휀1,t increases, then 
Si,t increases. Assuming c24 > 0 , Ei,t would increase, 휀1,t and Ei,t are positively cor-
related. Because 휀1,t is unobserved, all increases in Si,t are attributed to Ei,t , which 
causes an overestimation in c14 . Similarly, c24 would also be overestimated due to 
this feedback channel (assuming c14 > 0).
I use a feasible generalised least squares version of the 2SLS estimation to get 
asymptotically more efficient estimates. This model is generally called ‘three-stage 
least squares (3SLS)’ (Zellner and Theil 1962). This estimation procedure miti-
gates the bias with valid instrumental variables (IV) and further takes into account 
inter-temporal correlations between disturbance terms of equations. In our case, 
the contemporaneous correlation between 휀1,t and 휀2,t is likely to emerge, as some 
unobserved personal traits might simultaneously correlate with co-ethnic network 
formation and ethnic concentration.
I use the cultural diversity index at the province level as the instrument for ethnic 
concentration E. Much of the literature (see e.g. Bakens et al. 2013; Ottaviano and 
Peri 2005; Wang et al. 2016) uses an index of fractionalisation to measure cultural 
diversity, written as:
where sharegj is the share of ethnic group g over the total population in a specific 
region j. Div is region-specific and measures the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals from a given area will not belong to the same group. The higher 
the index, the more culturally diverse the region. I believe that immigrants not only 
value their own ethnic group but also appreciate the presence of other foreigners in 
their place of residence. By definition, this numerical value is not related to the rela-
tive intensity of the amount of time the migrant spends on co-ethnic friendship and 
Dutch friendship because the cultural diversity index is computed with the popula-
tion of different ethnic groups.
To instrument for social network variable S at the year of survey, an instrumental 
variable should be correlated with S but not directly correlated with E. Here, I use 
Dutch language proficiency at the year of survey. It is a categorical variable with 
(1) do not speak Dutch or find it very difficult, (2) not very well, sometimes find 
it difficult, (3) very well, never find it difficult. I convert it into values 0, 1, 2.15 As 
language is the fundamental medium of communication and network creation, this 
variable captures the fact immigrants more fluent in Dutch may spend more time 
(9)
Ei,t = c21 + c22Xi,t + c23LMi,t0 + c24Si,t + 휀2,t, t = 1,… , T and i = 1,… , I,
(10)Divj = 1 −
∑
g=1
share2
gj
, g = 1,… ,G and j = 1,… , J,
15 Although Surinamese and Antilleans have much higher levels of Dutch language proficiency than 
Turks and Moroccans, the variations of the proficiency levels exist.
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engaging with natives, and learn more about Dutch culture, life style, values and 
beliefs. They may thus be more confident in moving to a province with a low level 
of ethnic concentration. To be sure, one might worry about the correlation between 
the ethnic concentration and the Dutch language proficiency. On the one hand, being 
in a non-ethnically concentrated area would improve a migrant’s proficiency in 
Dutch. However, this positive impact is only very likely during childhood. Approxi-
mately 5% of our sample migrated before age 10. 85% of the respondents migrated 
after age 15. If they ever started learning Dutch, they took language courses instead 
of just learning from their neighbours. On the other hand, migrants with a low level 
of proficiency are unlikely to be attracted to an area where everyone speaks the local 
language (Bauer et al. 2005). This direct channel is true at a disaggregate level of 
spatial units, such as neighbourhood and district. When it comes to the city or prov-
ince level, the probability of meeting a person speaking a local language is relatively 
large for all regions. Accordingly, the impact of local language proficiency on loca-
tion choice (E) is more likely to operate via social networks (S) established after 
migration. Therefore, the location choice is based less on whether the individuals 
can communicate and more on whether they can grow their existing networks. Note 
that the ethnic concentration variable is measured at the year of survey, which can 
reflect the change of location after migration.
3.3  Estimation results
Table 4 shows the results of the simultaneous estimation for a sample of immigrants 
who obtained their first job in the Netherlands between the years of 1992 and 2001, 
where 훼 and 훿 are the main explanatory variables. I use the Engle’s autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) test to check whether there is a dynamic condi-
tional variance process (Engle 1982). The null hypothesis is homoscedasticity. It is a 
Lagrange multiplier test, and it does not reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level for 
both equations (8% for S equation and 28% for E equation).
Column (1) is for social networking, and column (2) is for ethnic concentration. 
In column (1), the intensity of co-ethnic networking is positively associated with a 
high vacancy rate (0.015). It is also evident that a high unemployment inflow per-
centage leads to less time spent in co-ethnic networks (− 0.114). The findings above 
confirm hypothesis H1 . In column (2), the ethnic concentration is the dependent vari-
able. The coefficient is positive for vacancies per thousand jobs (0.085). The negative 
association between the ethnic concentration and the unemployment inflow percentage 
(− 0.619) is also confirmed. These findings therefore confirm hypothesis H2.
The lower panel of Table 4 presents the estimates in the first stage. The coefficient 
for Dutch language proficiency is expected to be negative, implying that immigrants 
with local language skills allocate less time to co-ethnic contacts, ceteris paribus. 
The coefficient for the regional cultural diversity index is positive, implying that that 
migrants prefer to reside with co-ethnic networks and other foreign-born groups.
Table 5 shows the results of the simultaneous estimation for a sample of immi-
grants who obtained their first job in the Netherlands between 1969 and 2001, where 
w
1
,w1 , w2 , and w2 are the main explanatory variables. The ARCH test does not reject 
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the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 5% level for both equations (82% for S 
equation and 83% for E equation).
The average wage rates of representative sectors in the ethnic labour market and 
the host labour market are included as independent variables to proxy for w
1
,w1 , 
w
2
 , and w2 . Here, column (1) is for social networking and column (2) for ethnic 
concentration. Column (1) makes clear that the intensity of co-ethnic networking is 
positively associated with high average wage rates in the host labour market (0.176), 
and negatively associated with high average wage rates the ethnic labour market 
(− 0.218). The higher the wage difference between the ethnic labour market and the 
host labour market, the more time the immigrant spends in developing a co-ethnic 
network. The coefficients are significant for most of the individual characteristics. In 
column (2), the ethnic concentration is positively associated with a higher wage dif-
ference between the ethnic labour market and the host labour market (0.602). These 
findings confirm hypotheses H3 and H4 . Similarly, the lower panel of Table 5 pre-
sents the first stage in IV estimation.
Table 4  Simultaneous equations model for social network and ethnic concentration ( 훼 and 훿 as the main 
explanatory variables), job search year 1992–2001
The dependent variable of column (1) the social network measure in numerical values: (1) more contact 
with the natives; (2) equal contact with the natives and the co-ethnics; (3) more contact with the co-
ethnics. The dependent variable of column (2) is the percentage of the immigrant’s own ethnic group in 
her living municipality.
The reference category for each categorical variable is as follows. Education: no education.
The regressors not included in the table are ethnicity, gender, marital status, number of children, age at 
migration, working experience in the Netherlands, and monthly income. The time trend effect is con-
trolled for as well
***p < 0.01 ; **p < 0.05 ; * p < 0.1 
s∗ e∗
Number of vacancies ( 훼) 0.015 (0.006)** 0.085 (0.018)***
Unemployment inflow percentage ( 훿) − 0.114 (0.055)** − 0.619 (0.183)***
Residential preference ( 휎) 0.050 (0.028) ∗ 0.161 (0.106)
Moroccans ( 훽) − 0.198 (0.088)** − 0.036 (0.434)
Surinamese ( 훽) − 0.004 (0.129) 1.603 (0.418)***
Antilleans ( 훽) − 0.796 (0.169)*** − 4.322 (0.640)***
Years since migration ( 훽) − 0.009 (0.006) − 0.010 (0.025)
Primary education ( 훽) − 0.262 (0.123)** − 0.454 (0.540)
Lower education ( 훽) − 0.191 (0.124) − 0.049 (0.505)
Intermed. education ( 훽) − 0.081 (0.121) 0.170 (0.416)
Higher education ( 훽) − 0.182 (0.127) − 0.044 (0.505)
Constant 3.241 (0.357)*** 11.092 (3.710)***
First stage estimates
 Instrumental variable Dutch language proficiency Regional cultural diversity
 Coefficients − 0.102 (0.005)** 4.102 (0.393)***
 Weak instrument F test, p value 0.027 7.34e−14
 Num. obs. 1360 1360
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With regard to the residential preference parameter 휎 , Tables  4 and 5 unani-
mously show that both s and e are positively associated with 휎 . With regard to indi-
vidual characteristics 훽 , for example, having a lower level of education is associated 
with a higher level of co-ethnic networking. The ethnicity variable itself reflects the 
cultural distance between the home country and the Netherlands. Intuitively, Suri-
namese and Antilleans have lower cost of networking with natives due to historical 
ties with the Netherlands, and hence s∗ and e∗ are lower.
4  Concluding remarks
The compositions of the social networks that immigrants build in their new countries 
are meaningful both for their own economic performances in the destination country 
and for the dynamics of integration in their new society. This case study explored 
the ways in which the labour market conditions of the host country determine the 
Table 5  Simultaneous equations model for social network and ethnic concentration ( w
1
 , w
1
 , w
2
 , w
2
 as the 
main explanatory variables), job search year 1969–2002
The dependent variable of column (1) the social network measure in numerical values: (1) more contact 
with the natives; (2) equal contact with the natives and the co-ethnics; (3) more contact with the co-
ethnics. The dependent variable of column (2) is the percentage of the immigrant’s own ethnic group in 
her living municipality.
The reference category for each categorical variable is as follows. Ethnicity: Turks. Education: no educa-
tion.
The regressors not included in the table are gender, marital status, number of children, age at migration, 
working experience in the Netherlands, and monthly income. The time trend effect is controlled for as 
well
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗p < 0.1
s∗ e∗
Ethnic labour market ( w
1
,w
1
) − 0.218 (0.095)** − 0.413 (0.407)
Host labour market ( w
2
,w
2
) 0.176 (0.065)*** 0.602 (0.288)**
Residential preference ( 휎) 0.040 (0.014)*** 0.192 (0.062)***
Moroccans ( 훽) − 0.279 (0.042)*** − 0.012 (0.284)
Surinamese ( 훽) − 0.276 (0.044)*** 0.725 (0.281)***
Antilleans ( 훽) − 0.707 (0.072)*** − 5.187 (0.585)***
Years since migration ( 훽) − 0.014 (0.003)*** − 0.022 (0.017)
Primary education ( 훽) − 0.072 (0.052) 0.021 (0.209)
Lower education ( 훽) − 0.037 (0.053) 0.261 (0.205)
Intermed. education ( 훽) − 0.052 (0.054) 0.321 (0.209)
Higher education ( 훽) − 0.120 (0.059)** 0.075 (0.248)
Constant 2.634 (0.251)*** 8.620 (2.368)***
First stage estimates
 Instrumental variable Dutch language proficiency Regional cultural diversity
 Coefficients − 0.107 (0.002)*** 4.373 (0.185)***
 Weak instrument F test, p value 6.19e−6 < 2e−16
 Num. obs. 5712 5712
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social networks immigrants build upon arriving, with a focus on the experiences of 
immigrants to the Netherlands.
In brief, I developed a job and residential search model for an unemployed immi-
grant who has just arrived in her destination country. The immigrant has the choice 
of how much time she will spend in each of two social networks, the co-ethnic net-
work and the local Dutch network, as well as the choice of where she will reside. 
I derived the optimal time spent in co-ethnic networking and native networking as 
well as the optimal level of ethnic concentration. I tested the comparative statics of 
co-ethnic networks, native networks, and ethnic concentration with respect to local 
labour market conditions with data about Dutch immigrants. The empirical analysis 
supports the hypotheses from the theoretical framework, where I used instrumental 
variables to partially address the endogeneity in the simultaneous equations model.
This paper’s novelty is its finding that immigrants seem to spontaneously assim-
ilate less into their host society when the host economy is strong. When a buoy-
ant labour market exists, immigrants do not have a strong motive to build networks 
with natives. Immigrants are able to consume more of their ethnic goods when the 
economy is doing well. In contrast, an economic recession lowers the opportunity 
cost of developing native networks and therefore encourages immigrants to network 
more intensely with natives to better their employment prospects. This incompatibil-
ity sheds light on the fact that current policies encouraging migrants to pursue social 
integration might overlook migrants’ own motivations of creating networks depend-
ing on the local labour market.
While my empirical analysis focuses on a sample of immigrants to the Nether-
lands, the theoretical model of social network formation this paper presents may be 
applied to all immigrant-receiving countries, such as the UK, Canada, and Germany. 
Moving forward, researchers might do well to conduct a cross-country comparison, 
if, of course, such data exist about social contacts. Moreover, researchers may also 
explore the dynamic formation and impact of social networks. Battisti et al. (2016) 
investigated the short-term and long-term impacts of co-ethnic networks devel-
oped by an immigrant after arrival on the immigrant’s economic success. Although 
immigrants with larger co-ethnic networks at arrival are more likely to be employed 
before those with smaller or no such networks, such immigrants also have a lower 
probability of investing in human capital, a trend which yields lower wages in 
the long run. In addition, it may also prove informative to modify the theoretical 
model in the context of sequential decisions on choice of location and social net-
work formation in a way that takes into account the locked-in effect of living in 
an ethnic enclave. It is also helpful to note that bridging this topic to literature on 
urban economies will supplement the elements missing from the current model, e.g. 
urban amenities, housing price, cost of living, etc. The interdependent relationship 
between urban characteristics and social interaction is worthy of much more atten-
tion, especially given that costs of communication are decreasing and that job seek-
ers are increasingly using networking as a strategy for finding employment.
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Appendix 1
See Tables 6 and 7. 
Table 6  The definitions and coding of the variables in ‘social position and use of public facilities by 
immigrants’ (SPVA)
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
Contact composi-
tion during free 
time
‘In your spare time, do you have more contact with
Dutch people or do you have more contact with people
from your own ethnic group?’
1-More co-ethnic contact
2-Both equally
3-More contact with Dutch people
Monthly income ‘What is your total net monthly income?’
In year 2002, the currency changed from Dutch guilders to Euros. The exchange 
ratio 2.2:1 is used to unify the monetary unit across four waves
Education ‘What is the highest degree you have completed?’
0-No degree
1-Degree in primary education (LO)
2-Degree in secondary education (LBO/MAVO)
3-Degree in intermediate education (MBO/HAVO/VWO)
4-Degree in higher education (HBO/WO)
Work experience 
in NL
‘How long have you worked in total in the Netherlands?’
Dutch language 
proficiency
‘When you are in a conversation, do you have any difficulty in using Dutch lan-
guage?’
0-Yes, very difficult/ do not speak Dutch at all
1-Yes, sometimes
2-No, never
Residential prefer-
ence
’Do you prefer to live in a neighborhood where many people of your own ethni 
group live?’
1 3
The incompatibility of local economic prosperity and migrants’…
Table 6  (continued)
Variables Questions asked in the survey and coding
1-Strong dislike
2-Rather not
3-It does not matter
4-Rather well
5-Strong preference
Ethnicity ‘What is your ethnic group?’
1-Turks
2-Moroccans
3-Surinamese
4-Antilleans
Province Registered residence province
1-Amsterdam
2-Rotterdam
3-Den Haag
4-Utrecht
5-Eindhoven
6-Enschede
7-Almere
8-Alphen aan den Rijn
9-Bergen op Zoom
10-Hoogezand-Sappemeer
11-Delft
12-Dordrecht
13-Tiel
Leeuwarden, Spijkenisse, Zwijndrecht and Gornichem are recoded in SPVA 1991, 
but not in other waves. And hence we drop the observations in these municipalities
Nationality ‘What is your nationality?’
1-Orgin country’s nationality
2-Dutch nationality
3-Both the origin country’s and Dutch nationalities
4-Others
The answers are recoded to a dichotomous variable
which equals 1 if the respondent reported having
Dutch nationality, and 0 otherwise
Married ‘What is your marital status?’
1-Married
2-Divorced
3-Widow/widower
4-Never been married
Number of children ‘How many children are there living in the house?’
‘How many children are not living in the Netherlands?’
These two answers are summed up.
Years since migration ‘What is your length of stay in the Netherlands?’
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Appendix 2
This appendix illustrates how Eq. (1) is simplified to (3).
From Eq. (2) (the inflow value of being employed at wage rate w), W(wr) is derived 
using the reservation wage identity W(wr) = U,
(11)W(wr) = U =
wr + R(s, e)
r
.
Table 7  Descriptive statistics for cross-sectional data, adult immigrants. Source: SPVA 1991, 1994, 
1998, 2002
Respondents are those reported as the household head by the household members.
Income is measured as monthly net income in Dutch guilders, adjusted by CPI.
Residential preference parameter indicates the degree of preference for ethnic concentration.
Ethnic concentration is measured in percentages.
Statistic N Mean SD Min Max
Male 13,961 0.68 0.47 0 1
Age 13,998 39.99 10.40 25 64
Turks 13,968 0.28 0.45 0 1
Moroccans 13,968 0.26 0.44 0 1
Surinamese 13,968 0.28 0.45 0 1
Antilleans 13,968 0.19 0.39 0 1
Dutch nationality 13,998 0.61 0.49 0 1
YSM (in years) 13,760 16.31 9.64 0.00 52.50
Married 13,998 0.65 0.48 0 1
Number of children 13,998 2.35 2.20 0 17
No edu. 13,425 0.22 0.42 0 1
Primary edu. 13,425 0.28 0.45 0 1
Lower edu. 13,425 0.22 0.41 0 1
Intermed. edu. 13,425 0.18 0.38 0 1
Higher edu. 13,425 0.10 0.30 0 1
Do not speak Dutch 13,838 0.20 0.40 0 1
Dutch: not very well 13,838 0.30 0.46 0 1
Dutch: very well 13,838 0.51 0.50 0 1
Exp. in NL (in years) 13,855 10.34 8.57 0.00 48.00
Income (in Dutch guilders) 11,744 1867.34 825.66 0.00 16,508.26
Residential preference parameter 10,432 2.65 0.94 1 5
Year of first job 8567 1982.71 9.31 1953 2002
Ethnic concentration 11,382 4.79 2.81 0.26 9.73
Year of survey: 1991 13,998 0.18 0.39 0 1
Year of survey: 1994 13,998 0.18 0.39 0 1
Year of survey: 1998 13,998 0.37 0.48 0 1
Year of survey: 2002 13,998 0.26 0.44 0 1
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Substitute Eqs. (11) into (2) to obtain the following:
Then substituting Eqs. (12) into (1), it becomes:
Using the theorem of integration by parts,
where Qi is the surplus function of Fi(w) : Qi = ∫ wiwr (1 − Fi(w))dw . And this is the 
whole exposition for the derivation of Eq. (3).
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